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What Breathes Fire into the Equations* 




      Since the 17th century one of the main goals of physics has been the discovery of the 
fundamental constituents of physical reality and  the fundamental laws of nature that describe 
them. Fundamental laws are the nomological engines that underlie all lawful  regularities, 
causation, and explanations not only in physics and but also in the special sciences and 
macroscopic phenomena generally.  Proposals have included Newton’s laws of classical 
mechanics and gravitation, Maxwell’s electromagnetic field equations, Boltzmann’s statistical 
mechanics, Schrodinger’s and Dirac’s equations,  the principles of the standard model of 
quantum fields and particles, and the equations of General Relativity.  Some physicists dream of 
a final theory – what Steven Weinberg calls ‘the Theory of Everything” (TOE) - that unifies 
general relativity and quantum mechanics and specifies laws that cover all physical entities 
from the smallest to the largest.  
     While physicists have been busy proposing, elaborating, and testing systems of laws 
scientifically minded philosophers have engaged in discussions and disputes  about the 
metaphysics of laws. The metaphysical question is “in virtue of what does a generalization or an  
equation express a law?” Or as Steven Hawking more colorfully phrased it “What breaths fire 
into the equations?” In this paper I hope to contribute to the discussion of this question.   But 
first, a review of the current state of play bout the metaphysics of laws. 
      The idea that there are laws that govern the motions of material bodies and that it is the 
job of physicists to find them became prominent in the 16th and 17th centuries. Laws were then 
thought of either as mathematical descriptions of how God directly governs the motions of 
material bodies or as instruments used by God to govern their motions.1  In subsequent  
centuries the view that laws involve the Deity faded away although the metaphor of governing 
remained. This raises the question of the metaphysics of laws.  If not God, what makes a 
regularity or  equation a law? Contemporary philosophy is dominated by two approaches to 
answering this question  that I will call Necessitarian and Humean.2  The first holds that reality  
includes at its most fundamental level a kind of  necessity in virtue of which laws are able to 
play their roles in explanation, confirmation, counterfactuals and causation. In contrast, 
Humean accounts deny the need for fundamental necessity and say that laws are regularities 
that possess some other feature which enables them to play their roles.  
 
1 See Harrison (2019) for a god discussion of the early history of the concept of law of nature. Descartes was the key 
figure in promoting the idea that there are laws that govern the motions of bodies. 
2 “Governing” because the account originated in the 17th century with the idea that laws are the principles by which 
God governs the motions of bodies (see Harrison). “Humean” because Hume was the philosopher who first clearly 
rejected necessary connections and the governing account. There are also dispositionalist and neo-Aristotelian 
accounts; Cartwright (1999), Mumford (1998). These like governing views understand nomological modality as a 
fundamental feature of reality although they tend to deflate the significance of laws in favor of the dispositions and 
capacities of entities and systems. These views are not the focus of the current paper. 
       There are two main varieties of necessitarian accounts- governing views and powers views- 
that are accompanied by different views about the natures  of fundamental properties.3 On 
governing accounts laws are items  over and above the properties they govern while on powers 
views law are regularities that result from the activities of powers that inhere in properties.      
      Talk of governing echoes the concept’s 17th century theological birth but few of its 
present defenders make an overt appeal to theology to explicate it.4 Rather, they understand 
laws to be features of reality that govern events by necessitating regularities among them.5 
Some go further by connecting their accounts of laws with metaphysical views about time. On 
this approach a dynamical law governs by taking an event or the state of a system (or the entire 
universe) at a time (or on a Cauchy surface) and evolving it to states at subsequent times thus 
forging  connections between the earlier and later states.6  
     Talk of powers harkens back to pre-17th century Aristotelian science with its explanations in 
terms of capacities and dispositions. According to powers accounts  fundamental properties are 
dispositions that bestow on their instances the power  to bring about subsequent events.  Laws  
are regularities that result from the exercise of these powers.  For example, on this view 
 
3 Marc Lange has developed a third view in between these two according to which counterfactuals are fundamental 
and laws are expressed by propositions that possess a kind of counterfactual stability. See Lange (20xx) and Loewer 
(20xx) for a critique. 
4 For a discussion of the theological origin of the concept of laws of nature see Harrison (2xxx) 
Two philosophers who do make the connection between theology and governing explicit but for different reasons 
are John Foster (2005) and Nancy Cartwright (2004). Foster in The Divine Law Maker argues that God’s will is 
required to make sense of the governing role of laws and Cartwright in “No God No Laws” appeals the connection 
between laws and theology in her argument that there are no laws of nature and for a return to a more Aristotelian 
account of science. 
5 This type of account of laws was developed by Armstrong, Dretske and Tooley in the 1980s and more recently by 
Maudlin. 
6 Governing suggests a growing block account of time’s passage. Tim Maudlin (2007) proposes an account that only 
requires that time has an intrinsic direction but that by itself does not presuppose a growing block metaphysics of 
time. The connection between views of laws and views of time is discussed in Loewer (2012). 
gravitational mass is a property that has the power to produce an attractive force on other 
bodies that makes them accelerate and the gravitational law describe the resulting regularity. 
Since these regularities hold in virtue of the natures of the properties they connect, they are 
metaphysically necessary although which powers and so which laws are instantiated is 
contingent.  Most versions  of powers views also seem to involve a direction of time since the 
exercise of a power is temporally directed.7 
 
       Humean accounts of laws are so named because Hume is known as “the greater denier” of 
necessary connections.8 The way I use the term  Humean views don’t claim that there are no 
truths concerning natural necessities, laws, causation,  counterfactuals and other natural 
modalities but only  that they are not metaphysically fundamental.9  On Humean accounts such 
truths hold in virtue of laws not the other way around.   Humeans consider governing to be a 
misleading metaphor that remains from the theological origin of the concept of laws and 
fundamental powers to be a relic of medieval metaphysics. Instead, they construe fundamental 
laws to be truths that express scientifically significant regularities and patterns among 
instantiations of fundamental properties and quantities that are themselves individuated 
 
7 Since an object may be subject to a number of different powers these accounts need to be supplemented with laws 
that specify how powers compose. 
8 Lewis (1986) p. ix. Lewis thought that he was a great denier of necessary connection but Hume an even greater 
denier. Some say that Hume didn’t deny that there are necessary connections but claimed only that we have no 
impressions of them so causal  relations are not knowable. Strawson (1989). For a discussion of the actual Hume’s 
view of laws see Jacovides (2021) 
9 Humeans themselves divide into those who think that “it’s a law  that p” expresses  a truth and those who deny this 
and instead hold it expresses an attitude toward “p” e.g.  to use it in making predictions, explanations and so on. 
Craig Callender likens this division to the metaethical distinction between realism  and projectivism in meta-ethics . 
and argues that it is difficult to see a real disagreement between the two kinds of views as long as one holds that 
there are aptness conditions for asserting “it’s a law that p” and one is a minimalist about truth.. (Callender 2021) 
independently of laws and causal relations. Humeans claim  that such truths are capable of 
playing their roles in scientific explanations, etc. without any reliance on governing, powers or 
fundamental necessary connections.10 The most prominent contemporary Humean account of 
laws is David Lewis’ Humean Best System Account (BSA).11  According to the BSA a proposition 
expresses a fundamental law in virtue of its place in a system that systematizes and unifies 
patterns among events.  
       On powers views physical entities are active in virtue of their properties and laws are 
regularities that derive from the activity of the powers they instantiate. In contrast,  on 
governing and Humean views physical entities are by nature inert. Both latter views hold that 
fundamental properties and entities are individuated independently of laws and causal 
relations. They differ in that on governing accounts laws are features of reality that are over 
and above fundamental property instantiations that are responsible for nature’s activity by 
governing it while on Humean views laws are not features of reality in addition to property 
instantiations but are propositions that summarize and systematize their distribution in space-
time.12 Unlike some governing and powers views the BSA is not committed to time possessing 
an intrinsic direction. Governing and Powers view are compatible with presentist and growing 
block accounts of time while the BSA requires an eternalist view since it presupposes that it 
makes sense to think of  laws as systematizing the instantiations  of fundamental  properties 
 
10 Among recent proponents of Humean views are David Lewis, John Earman, Mike Hicks, Christian Loew and 
Barry Loewer. 
11 Lewis first discusses the account in Lewis (1973) and elaborates in Lewis (1986). He attributes the basic idea of 
the BSA to Mill and Ramsey. The BSA is further developed and defended in Loewer (1996) (2007) 
12 The idea that it is the nature of fundamental properties and entities to be metaphysically independent of laws is a 
descendent of the 17th century view that matter is inert and alterations in motion is due to governing laws that 
themselves derive from God. This view contrasted with the Aristotelian conception on which matter possesses 
intrinsic powers.  
throughout the entirety of space-time. Motion is not metaphysically fundamental but is a 
consequence of the patterns of instantiations.13   
        In this paper I will describe an account of the metaphysics of fundamental laws and 
fundamental properties I call “the Package Deal Account (PDA)” that is a descendent of Lewis’ 
BSA but differs from it in a number of significant ways. The most significant is that  unlike Lewis’ 
BSA, the PDA does not depend on the existence of the metaphysically elite fundamental 
properties/quantities that Lewis calls “perfectly natural” properties/quantities that are at the 
basis of his account. It replaces Lewis’ account with an account on which fundamental 
properties and entities are not metaphysically prior to the laws but on which they  and laws are  
co-equal elements of a package. The PDA earns its Humean credentials by maintaining that laws 
systematize the distribution of property instantiations and supervene on them. The PDA goes 
further than other philosophical accounts in explicating the notion of laws and fundamental 
properties in terms of the practice and aims of physics rather than relying  on metaphysical 
presuppositions. It thus advances the increasingly popular project of naturalizing metaphysics. 
As we will see, it also supports an immanent or embedded rather than a transcendent 
metaphysics of physics.   I begin by reviewing Lewis’ account of perfectly natural properties and 
his Humean BSA of laws.  
       
                                                        
 
13 For an excellent survey of  views of the metaphysics of time see Zimmerman (2005) 
 
 
 David Lewis’ Humean BSA 
     In “New Work for a Theory of Universals” Lewis announced that David Armstrong persuaded 
him that not all properties are equal.  He says that reality includes a distinction between 
perfectly natural properties/relations14 and the rest.  
“Formerly I had been persuaded by Goodman and others that all properties were 
equal: it was hopeless to try to distinguish 'natural' properties from gruesomely 
gerrymandered, disjunctive properties. 
Eventually I was persuaded, largely by D.M. Armstrong, that the distinction I had 
rejected was so commonsensical and so serviceable -indeed, was so often 
indispensable - that it was foolish to try to get on without it." 
According to Lewis properties are sets of possible individuals. On this view while properties in 
general are abundant, perfectly natural properties are sparse and special.15 They carve reality at 
its joints.  He says that the distinction between perfectly natural properties and the others is 
either itself primitive or that it may be explained in terms of primitive notions of universals or 
similarity. Lewis’ reason for taking naturalness or concepts in terms of which it can be defined 
as primitive is that he needs it for many of his metaphysical projects and he  cannot see how to 
analyze it in terms that don’t presuppose it. He writes 
Many philosophers are skeptical about the distinction between natural and gruesome 
properties. They think it illegitimate, unless it can somehow be drawn in terms that do 
not presuppose it. It is impossible to do that, I think, because we presuppose it 
constantly. Shall we say that natural properties are the ones that figure in laws of 
nature? - Not if we are going to use naturalness of properties when we draw the line 
between laws of nature and accidental regularities. Shall we say that they are the ones 
 
14 I use “property” to cover relations. 
15  Properties include not only monadic properties but relations. On Lewis’ account properties are sets of possible 
individuals, n-place relations are ordered n-tuples of  possible individuals. Fundamental individuals are either points 
of space time or point like entities and every such set is a property. 
that figure in the content of thought? - Not if we are going to say that avoidance of 
gratuitous gruesomeness is part of what constitutes the correctness of an ascription of 
content. Shall we say that they are the ones whose instances are united by 
resemblance? - Not if we are going to say that resemblance is the sharing of natural 
properties. Unless we are prepared to forgo some of the uses of the distinction between 
natural and unnatural properties, we shall have no easy way to define it without 
circularity. That is no reason to reject the distinction. Rather, that is a reason to accept it 
- as primitive, if need be.” 
 It is important to emphasize that on Lewis’ account which properties are perfectly 
natural is a matter of metaphysics. While fundamental laws relate perfectly natural properties 
it is not appearing in a law that makes a property perfectly natural but rather connecting 
perfectly natural properties is required for a generalization to be a law. Lewis says 
‘Natural properties’ suggests to some that it is nature that makes them natural: in other 
words, that it is contingent which properties are natural. That was not my intention. The 
properties that figure in the fundamental laws of nature are natural, but that is not 
because figuring in the laws makes them natural. Rather it is because regularities are fit 
to compete for the status of law hood only when formulated in terms of perfectly 
natural properties” 16  
Echoing Socrates, we can rephrase Lewis as saying “properties are not natural because they 
appear in laws but generalizations are laws (partly) because they connect natural properties.”  
      If a property is perfectly natural it is metaphysically necessary that it is perfectly natural  
although whether or not it is instantiated is contingent. There are alien perfectly natural 
properties that as a matter of contingent fact are not instantiated in the actual world. Lewis 
says that even though appearance in a law of  physics doesn’t make a property perfectly natural  
physics is our best guide to which properties are perfectly natural, or at least the non-alien 
ones.17 On the assumption that physics has been doing its job well he gives as examples of good 
 
Lewis (   ) fn 4 p 218. 
17 “And we may reasonably hope that physics-present day physics, or anyway some not-too-distant improvement 
thereof-will give us the inventory of all the perfectly natural properties and relations that ever appear in this world” 
(199Perfecty natural properties4 p.474). This makes it clear that he thinks that the existence of perfectly natural 
properties is a posit of metaphysics presupposed by physical inquiry.  
candidates for perfectly natural properties charge, mass, and spin.  These are determinable 
quantities that come in determinate quantitative values; e.g. mass of 1 gram.18 There may be 
necessary connections between perfectly natural determinates instantiated at the same point 
e.g. being 1 gram necessarily excludes other values of mass but  there are no necessary 
connections between properties instantiated at distinct points. Lewis also thinks that vector 
valued magnitudes like EM field values can qualify as perfectly natural even though there is 
some controversy concerning whether they should be so counted.19 
         In order for perfectly natural properties to perform some of their metaphysical jobs Lewis 
requires that they are intrinsic to  the individuals that instantiate them and are categorical. A 
property is intrinsic to its bearer only if its instantiation is metaphysically independent of the 
instantiations of properties by individuals in totally distinct space-time regions.20  A property is 
categorical iff it is individuated independently of laws and causal relations. Categorical 
properties contrast with dispositional properties and powers which are individuated  partially 
or wholly in terms of their nomological and causal connections.  
       The assumption that all fundamental properties are intrinsic and categorical enables Lewis 
to formulate a principle of recombination in his account of possible worlds. The principle says 
that given a space-time and the set of perfectly natural properties every mathematically 
possible way of combining  instantiations of perfectly natural properties to fill that space-time is 
a possible world and every possible world is such a combination. A proposition is 
metaphysically necessary if it is true at every possible world. On this account it is due to their 
role as fundamental constituents of possible worlds that perfectly natural properties deserve to 
be described as “carving nature at its joints.”  
 
18 Lewis also thinks that there are also degrees of naturalness. The property green is less natural than the property 
charge but more natural than the property grue. Fundamental laws involve perfectly natural properties but special 
science lawful regularities may involve properties that are less natural than the perfect ones.  
19 The problem is that since vectors possess direction they may not be intrinsic. See Basse (2010) for discussion 
20 Of course, the instantiation of a categorical quantity (e.g. mass of five grams) may be incompatible with the 
instantiation of a distinct categorical quantity (mass of 6 grams) at the same point.  
      Lewis describes his version of Humeanism as “the doctrine that all there is in the world 
is a vast mosaic of local matters of particular fact, just one little thing and then another” (1986, 
ix) His name for the distribution of perfectly natural properties throughout all of space-time  is 
“the Humean mosaic” (HM). The mosaic is Humean since there are no necessary connections 
among fundamental property instantiations at different points or in different regions.  Relations 
can also be perfectly natural  but Lewis tentatively proposes that the only perfectly natural 
relations instantiated in the actual world are geometrical and topological; e.g. distances 
between points.21 He calls this addition to Humeanism “Humean Supervenience” (HS). HS is a 
contingent claim that Lewis thinks is plausibly true of our world but worries that it might be 
violated by quantum mechanics.22  
     Lewis doesn’t say much about fundamental entities but seems to hold that they are 
particulars that have no parts.  They are instantiated at space time points or are space-time 
points themselves. I will suppose the latter since fundamental entities other than space-time 
points can be eliminated in favor of points that instantiate perfectly natural properties that 
characterize the entities.23 So, for example, a Newtonian particle is a trajectory through space 
time each of whose points instantiates the same mass value. On this account a field is not a 
fundamental entity since it exists throughout all of space-time but  a field is composed of points 
that instantiate field values which are fundamental. 
         On Lewis’ account the metaphysically fundamental ingredients of contingent reality are 
exhausted by the distribution of perfectly natural properties and relations in space-time. All 
truths at the actual world including truths about laws, causation, probability, nomological 
necessity etc. supervene on the HM. This means that any two worlds with exactly the same 
 
21 It is not clear whether Lewis thinks of the geometrical principles that describe distance relations at a world, e.g. 
the triangle inequality for Euclidian geometry, as necessary truths or as laws that describe regularities involving 
them. The latter understanding is more suited for a throughgoing Humeanism. 
22 The reason is that quantum states seem to involve fundamental entanglement relations between quantum systems. 
There are ways of responding to this that save the letter of HS but have other costs. Se Loewer (1996) Esfeld (2014) 
23 See Hall (2010) for a discussion. 
HMs are exactly alike in every other respect i.e. they are the same world. In metaphorical 
terms, all God had to do to create the universe is to create the HM. Everything else followed. To 
support this claim Lewis developed accounts of laws, probability, counterfactuals and causation 
on which these supervene on the HM. His accounts are all controversial but they make it at 
least plausible that our world is Humean.  
 The BSA specifies how laws supervene on possible worlds by identifying which 
regularities in the HM qualify as fundamental laws.  
Take all deductive systems whose theorems are true. Some are simpler better 
systematized than others. Some are stronger, more informative than others. These 
virtues compete: An uninformative system can be very simple; an unsystematized 
compendium of miscellaneous information can be very informative. The best system is 
the one that strikes as good a balance as truth will allow between simplicity and 
strength. How good a balance that is will depend on how kind nature is. A regularity is a 
law iff it is a theorem of the best system. (1994a p.478) 
     Lewis’ account seems at once both too broad and too narrow. It is too broad since it counts 
any theorem of the best system that expresses a regularity as a law. So, the disjunction of 
Schrodinger’s equation and the mass of the earth would  count as a law.   It is better to restrict 
the name “fundamental law” to those propositions that are axioms of the best system or, since 
candidate systems will typically have more than one optimal axiom formulation, count axioms 
of any such a formulation as a fundamental law and call  theorems “nomologically necessary.”24 
Fundamental laws according to the BSA are, of course, not metaphysically fundamental since 
they and their  being laws supervene on the HM. The account may be too narrow since Lewis 
restricts “law” to those theorems that express regularities. But there are some propositions 
that may play a role in systematizing the HM that are not normally considered to express 
regularities but nevertheless may deserve to be called laws.25   
 
24 For example, classical mechanics has a number of different formulations e.g. Newtonian, Hamiltonian, 
Lagrangian,. We can call the axioms of any of these formulations fundamental laws or relativize the notion of 
“fundamental law” to particular formulations.  
25 I have in mind, for example, the “past hypothesis” that specifies the low entropy microstate of the universe around 
the time of the big bang that plays a central role in statistical mechanics. Since adding it to the dynamical laws and 
statistical mechanical probability distribution increases the informativeness of the system at little cost in simplicity it 
qualifies as a law. 
     Objective probabilities enter Lewis’ account together with laws by letting deductive systems 
include sentences that specify objective probabilities of events.  
Consider deductive systems that pertain not only to what happens in history, but also to 
what the chances are of various outcomes in various situations - for instance the decay 
probabilities for atoms of various isotopes. Require these systems to be true in what 
they say about history....Require also that these systems aren't in the business of 
guessing the outcomes of what, by their own lights, are chance events; they never say 
that A without also saying that A never had any chance of not coming about. (1995 
p.480) 
By including probability functions in the language in which laws are formulated a system can 
increase its informativeness enormously at little cost to simplicity without adding additional  
fundamental ontology. On this account objective probabilities are always linked to laws. They 
are objective although not fundamental features of the HM. They are not subjective degrees of 
belief although they guide degrees of belief via a principle Lewis calls “the Principal Principle.” 
(PP). The PP says that a person’s degree of belief that A ought to match the objective 
probability of A as long as she has no inadmissible information.26  Lewis thought  objective 
probabilities are always associated with indeterministic dynamical  laws but his account also 
applies to objective probabilities compatible with theories with deterministic dynamical laws 
like those found in statistical mechanics and Bohm’s version of quantum theory.27 The fact that 
Lewis’ BSA extends to cover probabilistic laws is one of its great advantages. 
       The BSA says that laws and objective probabilities are determined by the systematization of  
the HM that optimally balances informativeness and simplicity. Lewis characterizes 
informativeness in terms of number of possibilities excluded, fit in terms of likelihood of the 
 
26  Lewis’ initial version of the PP says that one’s degree of belief that A given that the objective probability of A is 
x and that one has no “inadmissible” evidence should be x. Information  that bears on an event over and above its 
bearing on the event’s probability  is inadmissible. It turns out  that there is a conflict between Lewis’ Humean 
account of probabilities and the PP that led Lewis to modify the PP (Lewis 1994) and subsequently to a vast 
discussion.  See especially Ismael (2008). 
27 See Loewer (2001) 
world given the system, and  simplicity in terms of syntactic complexity, number of axioms and 
number of constants.  The reasons he includes these in his characterization of the law 
determining best system is that these are  among the criteria that have been employed in the 
history of physics to evaluate proposals for fundamental theories and it is evident why they are 
desirable in a systematization.  
     Lewis’ discussions of the criteria for evaluating systems are sketchy, inadequate and 
incomplete. Simplicity, as it is appealed to in evaluating physical theories is a complicated 
matter involving considerations  of the forms  of equations, numbers of fundamental constants, 
and ease of deriving significant consequences. Lewis’ account of informativeness in terms of 
number of possibilities excluded is much too crude. It  is not merely the quantity of information 
that is valuable in a theory. Some information is more important than other and especially 
important is how the information is organized. It counts in favor of a system if it organizes 
information so as to provide understanding by showing how disparate phenomena are related 
to each other and in a  way that it can be used for explanation and prediction. One way in 
which proposals for fundamental theories does this is by way of distinguishing dynamical laws 
and initial conditions.28  For example, the dynamical laws of classical mechanics specify how the 
state of a system of particles (i.e. their positions and momenta) evolve to states at subsequent 
times. By making this distinction dynamical  laws are able to provide information about how a 
system would evolve were it to begin in alternative states. Probabilistic laws provide 
information about the HM via their role guiding  belief according to the PP. Adding  probability 
to the language in which candidates for law determining systems can be formulated requires 
additional criteria for evaluating the goodness of candidate systems that measure 
informativeness. Lewis suggests degree of fit by which he means the probability of the mosaic 
given the candidate system. This encounters difficulties and a better way of evaluating 
probabilistic informativeness is needed. 29  The criteria for evaluating candidate systems 
requires more discussion than I can give it here. For now, it suffices to understand Lewis’ 
proposals for the  criteria for evaluating  systems as  gesturing in the direction of the criteria 
actually used by physicists to evaluate proposals for fundamental theories. 
     The guiding idea of the BSA is that what makes a regularity a law is its place in a system that 
organizes information about events and regularities by subsuming them under more general 
regularities and ultimately under the axioms of an optimal system. Proponents of governing 
and powers views may also think that, as a matter of fact, lawful truths of our world can be 
 
28 The importance of the distinction between dynamical laws and initial conditions is emphasized by Ned Hall 
(2015). See also Callender (2021) for a discussion of criteria on a systematization for it to perform the jobs that 
physics expect laws to perform. 
29 Adam Elga (2008) points out that there are problems with Lewis criteria for evaluating probabilistic laws in terms 
of fit and suggests an alternative. 
systematized and that looking for a systematization is a good way to look for laws. But they 
don’t think that it is  systematizing that makes regularities lawful but rather lawfulness comes 
from the  necessary connections that enforce regularities.  While proponents of necessitarian 
views claim to  be able to imagine worlds that contain laws that are not components of a 
system but in which there is a single isolated law, for example, that all ravens are black, 
Humeans think that such imaginings are flights of fancy disconnected from actual science. 
According to the BSA laws are by nature components of a system of laws.30 This difference 
makes for an important difference between the ways the  two approaches think of how laws 
explain. On governing accounts laws explain an event by playing a role in bringing the event 
about or constraining what events can occur. On powers accounts laws explain by pointing to 
the powers that bring events about. Because Humean laws don’t literally govern or involve 
powers non-Humeans often claim that they don’t explain at all.31  But this misunderstands the 
ways that laws are involved in explanations on Humean accounts. As mentioned, one way 
Humean laws explain is by showing how seemingly disparate phenomena are related to each 
other. Vivid examples of this are provided by Newtonian mechanics’ unification of celestial and 
terrestrial motions and Darwinian natural selection’s unifcation the  evolution of  all life forms. 
Another way in which Humean laws are involved in explanations is by backing counterfactuals 
and singular casual claims. 32 For example, Newtonian laws back counterfactuals  concerning 
 
30 As mentioned earlier the concept of law of nature that took root in the 17th century included both the idea that 
laws describe how God governs and also that since God is supremely rational that they are components of a 
mathematical systematization. See Harrison (2019) Ott(2019) 
31 The objection to Humean accounts is that if what makes a regularity a law is the HM it would be circular for the 
law to explain the HM. But this depends on thinking of laws as explaining by playing a role in producing or 
governing the HM. Humeans reject this account of how laws explain. See maudlin (  ) and Lange (  ) for the 
objection and Loewer (   ) for a rebuttal. 
32This is discussed in Hicks (fort).  
the motions of projectiles e.g. if the cannon’s angle had been greater the shell would not have 
hit the target.  Much more needs to be said  about how Humean  laws explain. For now, I just 
want to emphasize that from the Humean perspective the idea that laws explain by enforcing 
regularities is left over from the theological origin of the concept of laws of nature and so the 
fact that Humean laws  don’t explain because they don’t enforce is not a serious objection.  
       Lewis’ formulation of the BSA relies essentially on his distinction between perfectly natural 
properties and the rest since if there is no restriction on which properties can be referred to in 
the basic predicates of a candidate system the BSA collapses. Let Fx be a predicate that is true 
of only individuals that exist at the actual world and suppose with Lewis, that individuals are 
world bound.  Then VxFx is maximally informative on Lewis’ account of informativeness since it 
excludes all possibilities except the actual world. It is also very simple and consequently wins 
the competition for the world’s best theory. But VxFx entails all truths and so renders all 
generalizations nomologically necessary thus trivializing the BSA. This is absurd. We can dismiss 
VxFx as unqualified to be a candidate for a best system since no one will be awarded a Nobel 
prize for proposing it but that is not enough. Further restrictions on the vocabulary in which 
candidates for optimal  system are formulated are needed since we also want to exclude 
gerrymandered grue-like predicates from laws. The remedy according to Lewis is to restrict 
candidates for best theory to those that are formulated in a language whose basic non- logical 
and non-mathematical predicates refer only to perfectly natural properties and relations. Since 
it is physics and not the special sciences that aims to find perfectly natural properties this 
restricts Lewis’ account to an account of fundamental laws of physics. However, the idea the 
best systems idea can be applied to special  science properties as well but exactly what makes a 
special science regularity lawful requires more discussion that I leave for elsewhere.33  
      Although it was Lewis who proposed that there are perfectly natural properties and 
emphasized their importance in the BSA both governing and powers views of fundamental laws 
also presuppose the existence of elite fundamental properties. On Armstrong’s governing view 
a fundamental law is a necessitation relation between  universals and on powers views only 
select fundamental properties possess the power to produce lawful regularities. On all three 
views only  elite properties appear in fundamental laws. Hicks and Schaffer call the claim that 
only elite fundamental properties appear in fundamental laws “Link.”(2017)  They observe that 
if it is true then propositions  that express laws but refer to different fundamental properties 
express different laws even if they belong to systems that mathematically equivalent. They 
argue against Link by  examining the way physicists actually formulate and use laws in 
explanations and predictions. For example, there are alternative formulations of classical 
mechanics Newtonian, Hamiltonian, Lagrangian, and so on, whose basic equations refer to 
different properties but are treated by physicists as specifying the same dynamical laws.34 If 
Link is right then at most one of these can be the correct formulation. On governing accounts at 
most one of the laws can do the governing and on powers accounts at most one of the powers 
mentioned in one of the formulations can bring about subsequent events.  On the BSA at most 
one of the properties that occur in the formulations can be perfectly natural. Hicks and Schaffer 
point out that the BSA, governing and powers accounts are all committed to Link. But, as we 
will see, the PDA is different since it is not committed to there being a unique set of 
 
33 Callender and  Cohen develop an account of special science laws by appealing  to Lewis’ best system approach 
restricted to special science predicates. An account that connects special science laws more directly to fundamental 
laws is in Loewer (2020) 
34 Jill North (forthcoming) provides some reasons to think that these different formulations specify different laws 
only one of which could be the actual laws.  
fundamental properties or a uniquely correct formulation of laws that physicists treat as 
equivalent. 
 
     The BSA should not be thought of as an analysis of the concept of law of nature but instead 
as a proposal for the best way of understanding what fundamental laws are in physics. The 17th 
century conception of natural law is an amalgam of the idea that laws describe how God 
governs the motions of bodies and the idea that the rules that describe these motions are 
simple, mathematical, and systematic.35 The BSA dispenses with the fist aspect and promotes 
the second. The question is whether this revised concept of law captures the way fundamental 
laws are used in physics and be justified by its philosophical virtues. Proponents claim that it 
describes how the concept of fundamental law is actually employed in physics and argue in its 
favor is that it frees the concept of law from its theological origins and dispenses with the 
obscure metaphors of governing and powers. Since it builds the aim of theoretical physics to 
find simple and informative systems into its characterization of laws it provides the beginnings 
of an answer to the question of how physics finds fundamental laws and by connecting them 
with unification why they are worth finding.  Further, it can be naturally extended to 
accommodate non-dynamical laws and laws that specify probabilities including probabilities 
compatible with deterministic dynamical laws. 
         Opponents of Lewis’ Humean BSA argue that its virtues, whatever they may be, are 
outweighed by its vices. In particular,  proponents of necessitarian accounts  argue that Lewis’ 
 
35 Ott (2020) describes how the 17th century concept of law included both governing and systematizing especially in 
Berkeley. 
Humean BSA violates intuitions to the effect that worlds that match with respect to their HMs 
may differ in their laws and that laws need not be components of a world’s Lewisian best 
system.36 More importantly proponents of both governing and powers views argue that Lewis’ 
BSA fails to account for the roles of laws in explanation, induction, and grounding causation.37 
From the perspective of necessitarian accounts regularities in a Humean world appear to be 
flukes holding by  coincidence or chance and so not capable of supporting explanations and 
inductive inference. I think these objections can be answered and I and others have argued so 
elsewhere.38 Here I want to discuss some other problems for Lewis’ BSA that result from its 
reliance on Lewis’ metaphysics of perfectly natural properties and their role in the BSA and 
propose an alternative account that avoids these problems.  
  
   The BSA’s problems with perfectly natural properties 
       The first problem with building the BSA on the metaphysics of perfectly natural properties is 
that contemporary physics apparently posits fundamental entities, properties and relations that 
are not perfectly natural properties and are not compatible with HS.  Quantum theory,  in 
particular creates difficulties for HS’s commitment to restricting perfectly natural relations to 
metrical ones and to perfectly natural properties always possessing determinate values. 
 
36 Thought experiments that mine these intuitions are discussed by Carroll (19xx). From its origin the concept of law 
of nature  was an amalgam of the idea that laws govern (or describe how God governs) motion of matter and that 
they form a system (since God is perfectly rational) that mathematically describes the motion of matter. Since these 
components can be separated it is not surprising that we can tap into anti Humean intuitions.  
37 Carroll, Armstrong, Maudlin, Foster, Emery, Lange, Lazorovici make arguments all along these lines.  
38 Loewer 1996,2012, 2020 Beebee (2000), Hicks, Miller. See also Bhogal (2020) for a recent survey of objections  
to Humean accounts and Humean responses. 
          The problems arises because quantum mechanics posits entangled states that on their 
face value seem to involve relations other  than metrical relations between (among) occupants 
of distinct regions of ordinary space time and in which some properties fail to possess 
determinate values.  For example, a pair of electrons in the EPR state 
EPR)   1/√2|UP1>|DOWN2> - 1/√2|DOWN1>|UP2> 
is in a state in which neither electron has a determinate spin but the spins of the electrons are 
correlated. Even worse for Lewis’ account are states in which particles lack determinate 
location since it is difficult to see how such states can be understood in terms of points or 
individuals occupying points in 3-dimensional space instantiating properties. Lewis was worried 
about quantum mechanics saying  
I am not ready to take lessons in ontology from quantum physics as it now is. First, I 
must see how it looks when it is purified of instrumental frivolity...of double thinking 
deviant logic..and - most of all - when it is purified of supernatural tales about the power 
of the observant mind to make things jump. (1986 p. xi)  
However, there are a number of versions of quantum theory that have been purified of 
instrumental frivolity and which have explicit ontologies and laws. Almost all these accounts 
violate HS in one way or another. Specifically, it is difficult  to see how HS can accommodate the 
quantum mechanical state.39   Further conflicts with HS come from quantum gravity theories 
that posit entities that are not point like (e.g. strings and branes), space-times that have more 
 
39 See Loewer (1996) for a way of saving the letter of HS by positing that the fundamental physical space is 3n 
dimensional configuration space and the  QM state is a field in it. Michael Esfeld, Eddy Chen, Harjit Bhogal and Z 
Perry and others have proposed versions of Bohmian mechanics that are compatible with HS but at the cost of 
excluding the wave function from fundamental ontology. On their account the fundamental ontology consist solely 
of point particles. Their idea is to construe the quantum state not as part of the ontology but  as systematizing the 
trajectories of particles. That is, more along the lines of the way that Lewis understands laws.  This approach is 
compatible with HS but at the risk of adding a possibly a very complicated description to the best systematization. 
than 3+1 dimensions and even ones in which space-time is not fundamental but is claimed to 
emerge from something more fundamental. So, there is reason to think that HS is not true or, 
at least that physicists don’t feel constrained by it. Lewis understood HS to be a conjecture that 
might turn out to be false so might not grieve if it is given up since the Humean mosaic can be 
expanded to include properties that are instantiated by regions (or individuals) that are larger 
than point size (like strings) and relations other than geometrical relations (like entanglement 
relations) while maintaining the idea that the mosaic consists of the instantiations of perfectly 
natural  properties and relations.   
      There are further developments in contemporary physics that call the entire Humean 
ontological basis on which Lewis’ BSA is built into question. Some current physical theories 
posit fundamental properties and quantities that are not intrinsic to the regions in which they 
are instantiated and  are not categorical and whose ontologies don’t fit easily into the 
framework of individuals and properties. It has been claimed that this is the case for quantum 
field theory and the standard model of elementary particles. For example, French and McKenzie 
argue that QFT and the standard model contain symmetry principles that individuate certain 
fundamental quantities and entities and so imply that the properties and entities instantiated in 
distinct regions are not intrinsic and involve necessary connections.  
…the properties through which the fundamental constituents of matter interact in terms 
of gauge transformations, and these bring in their wake the appropriate gauge bosons, 
then it looks as if we have no choice but to say that the properties such as charge and 
color are not the sort of properties that lone objects can have, and hence that these 
properties are not after all intrinsic.  
Another example is that the symmetry principles of the standard model entail that it is  
metaphysically impossible  for there to be fermions with their particular masses unless there is 
a Higgs field. This seems to make mass a non-intrinsic property so it doesn’t qualify as perfectly 
natural. Tim Maudlin goes further suggesting that it is not right to think of QFT on the model of 
entities bearing properties and relations. According to Maudlin the QFT representation of 
certain quantities (e.g. quark  color) as fiber bundles implies that these quantities are not 
metaphysically independent: 
We should note that adopting the metaphysics of fiber bundles invalidates a set of 
modal intuitions that have been wielded by David Lewis under the rubric of the Principle 
of Recombination. According to Lewis, Hume taught us that the existence of any item 
puts no metaphysical constraints on what can exist adjacent to it in space. This invites a 
cut-and-paste approach to generating metaphysical possibilities: any object could in 
principle be duplicated elsewhere, immediately adjacent to the duplicate of any other 
item (or another duplicate of itself)... Duplication is supposed to be a metaphysically 
pure internal relation between items. But from the point of view of fiber bundle theory, 
it makes no sense to ‘copy’ the state of one region of space-time elsewhere even in the 
same space-time, much less in a disjoint space-time. There is no metaphysical copying 
relation such as the Principle of Recombination presupposes.40 
One could try to save the letter of Lewis’ Humeanism in the face of these examples by adding 
further fundamental relations and understanding the space-time as higher dimensional thus 
further violating HS. But an alternative would be to admit that a true fundamental theory may 
posit an ontology that is not representable in terms of a Humean Mosaic while seeing if it is 
 
40 Se Maudlin 2007 .p.103) 
possible to save the core idea of the BSA that what makes a proposition express a law is not 
governing but its role in systematizing. I will return to this suggestion shortly. 
  The BSA also faces a number of difficulties due to its reliance on perfectly natural 
properties that are primarily philosophical. Here are three problems that will lead to my 
revision of the Lewis’ account.  
     The first problem is that since perfectly natural properties are categorical it appears that 
they are or have unknowable quiddities. Quiddities are for properties  what haecceities are for 
individuals- a something we know not what- that makes it the property it is independently of its 
causal and nomological relations. A consequence is that categorical properties can swap causal 
and nomological roles in different possible worlds or even within a single world without any 
way of our knowing.  So, for example, if negative charge and positive charge are perfectly 
natural properties then there are two possible worlds which have the same nomological 
structures but in which instantiations of positive and negative charge switch places.  It is also 
possible that within a single possible world there are distinct categorical properties that play 
indiscernible  nomological roles. For example, there is a world in which there are 10 different 
perfectly natural properties all playing the role of negative charge. Such metaphysical 
possibilities lead Lewis and Langton to endorse a view they call “Ramseyan humility”, the view 
that there are facts which are irremediably unknowable since there is no way to discover which 
world we are in.  I am not sure that Ramseyan humility really does follow or, if it does, that this 
is a problem. My worry is that since quiddities apparently make no scientific difference  it 
would be better for a scientific metaphysics to avoid them if possible. Avoiding quiddities 
means that fundamental properties are not categorical but possess some of their nomological 
roles essentially. This seems plausible in its own right since theories posit properties along with 
laws that involve them. It is difficult  to think that a property could be mass if it didn’t play the 
nomological  role of mass or that anything that does play that role could be anything other than 
mass. One version of this view called “nomic structuralism” claims that a property just is a node 
in a web of nomological relations. Nomic structuralism avoids positing scientifically meaningless 
metaphysical distinctions but it has struck some philosophers as unsatisfactory since it seems to 
imply that all there is to reality is structure without content.  Russell referred to  this view with 
the  cryptic remark “There are many possible ways of turning some things hitherto regarded as ‘real’ 
into mere laws concerning the other things. Obviously, there must be a limit to this process, or else all 
the things in the world will merely be each other’s washing.”41 Russell seems to be saying that there 
must be some fundamental properties that are not individuated by laws. So, we are left with a 
puzzle. It seems unsatisfactory that all fundamental properties are categorical as Lewis’ account 
requires but also unsatisfactory that all are individuated by the laws to which they conform. 
Perhaps some properties are one and some the other and some a combination of a quiddity 
together with essential laws. But we are left without a principle that tells us which are which. It 
would  be better for our metaphysics of laws and properties to be non- committal about this 
issue and leave it to physics to decide, if it needs to, which fundamental properties are 
categorical and which are fundamental dispositions and which are mixtures of the two.42  
 
41  The view that all properties are individuated entirely in terms of their necessary connection to one another  
42 Michael Esfeld (2019) has developed a view he calls “super Humeanism” in which the only fundamental property 
is being a particle and the only fundamental relation is distance. All other predicates and function terms in a theory 
are understood as devices  for systematizing particle trajectories in much the same way that the BSA treats 
probabilities. This avoids issues re quiddity swapping. But in  my view it takes Humeanism too far since the axioms 
of the systematization will need to be immensely complicated to informatively systematize particle trajectories for a 
world like ours. (see Callender   ) 
         A rather different problem with Lewis’ BSA was raised by Bas van Frassen (1989). Van 
Frassen pointed out that it seems possible for there to be a true theory T that optimally satisfies 
the criteria implicit in physics i.e. fulfills all of Steven Weinberg’s dreams for a TOE, and yet not 
be the Lewisian Best system since its fundamental predicates fail to refer to perfectly natural 
properties. If so the class of propositions T claims express laws may not match the class deemed 
laws by the Lewisian BSA. Lewis claims that physics aims to locate perfectly natural properties 
and the fundamental properties of  contemporary physics are the best candidates we have for 
perfectly natural properties but, as Heather Demarest points out, that a theory that optimally 
accounts for the motions of all bodies and satisfies other desiderata on a fundamental theory 
doesn’t coincide with  the best systematization of the distribution of perfectly natural 
properties.43 Physics aims to find nature’s scientific joints, but these may not coincide with her 
Lewisian metaphysical joints, assuming she has them, and this can result in a mismatch 
between laws of the BSA and the laws according to ideal physics. Here is an example of how 
this can come about. On Lewis’ account there is a possible world in which different perfectly 
natural properties (i.e. properties with different quiddities) play the nomic role that we think 
mass plays in our world (assuming our world is Newtonian) in different space time regions. If so, 
then the language in which the best system is formulated will contain different predicates for 
each of these mass properties and one of the axioms of the system will be a disjunction 
specifying the behavior of each of these mass properties. It would  thus be more complicated 
than the best systematization formulated in the language of physics which counts these 
properties as identical.  It could turn out that the system that results by dropping some of the 
 
43 See Demarest (2017) for an account  of how this can happen.  
disjuncts associated with regions with few particles will be sufficiently simpler to overcome the 
decrease in informativeness. If this is the case, then the laws specified by that system will 
specify the Lewisian laws while the physicist’s theory will be the usual Newtonian theory even 
though mass is not a perfectly natural property. Call this “the mismatch problem.”44 
 A defender of Lewis’ view of the role of perfectly natural properties might respond that 
the possibility of mismatch is not a problem at all but simply a consequence of realism about 
laws and properties. One might claim that there are metaphysical facts about which properties 
cut nature at its joints and even a theory that satisfies all the other scientific desiderata but is 
mistaken about which properties are perfectly natural is simply wrong about the laws. But it 
seems to me that this takes realism too far. It is presumptuous for a metaphysician to say to, 
for example, Steven Weinberg who believes he has found a theory that optimally satisfies all 
scientific criteria including truth that he may not have discovered the  fundamental  scientific 
properties and laws. If one thinks, as I do, that it is physics not metaphysics that determines 
where nature’s joints are this response is not appealing.45   
       There is a third problem with the role of perfectly natural properties in Humean account  of 
laws distinct from but closely related to the mismatch problem that Shamik Dasgupta calls “the 
 
44 The mismatch problem is discussed by van Frassen (1989), Loewer (2007) and Demarest (     ) who suggested its 
name.  
45 Another response to the  mismatch problem is to argue that  since perfectly natural properties are “reference 
magnets” it won’t arise. David Lewis suggested this in conversation (Sept 2001). I don’t know of an explicit 
argument although  Cian Dorr remarks that “natural properties are widely held to be easier to refer to, ceteris 
paribus. So, arguably, a situation where people ended up with true scientific theories stated in a language whose 
basic predicates were too unnatural for the axioms to meet the bar for law hood would have to be quite remote and 
unusual.” (Dorr 2019) 
problem of missing value.”46 The problem is that if perfect naturalness is a metaphysical 
primitive there needs to be an explanation of why physicists should value and aim to find  the 
best systematization of truths expressed in the language of perfectly natural properties as 
opposed to systematizations of truths in other languages?   A TOE that optimally satisfies all 
scientific criteria but fails to match the Lewisian best system because it is not formulated in the 
language of perfectly natural properties does not seem to lack any value of interest to science. 
In fact, satisfaction of Lewis’ requirement that the law determining optimal system is 
formulated in the language of perfectly natural properties may come at the cost of satisfying 
some of the criteria that science does value. 
     Dasgupta observes that there are many collections of  predicates whose instantiations can 
serve as the supervenience bases for all truths and instead of formulating the best system in 
terms of systematizing all the facts specified in the language of perfectly natural properties we 
could formulate best systems accounts in terms of a language whose primitive predicates refer 
to the perfectly natural* or perfectly natural** properties and so on, Such systems plausibly will 
determine different so called “laws”; laws*, laws**, and so on. The question is “what is it about 
perfectly natural properties that makes them suitable to guide physical theorizing and 
determine which propositions are those that physics seeks to find and call laws?” It is not 
adequate to simply claim that “they are the ones that guide physical theorizing because they 
are perfectly natural” or because “they cut nature “at the joints.” This would  be, to borrow 
Lewis’ quip, like saying that someone has strong arms just because he is called “Armstrong.” 
 
46 Dasgupta (2018). Dasgupta’s discussion is detailed and subtle. I understand him as providing an argument that an 
adequate account of laws should explain what it is about laws so characterized that makes discovering them 
objectively valuable for scientists.  
Why does a property deserve to be called “perfectly natural” or  “a joint of nature?”  Lewis 
assumes that  reality comes with perfectly natural properties and that it is the job of  physics to 
find them and  laws characterized in terms of them. It is supposed to be an objective matter 
what the optimal system and the laws are and that physicists ought to try to find them. The 
problem is that without an explanation of why it has such normative force we have no more 
reason to think that the best theory formulated in the language of perfectly natural properties 
rather than the best theory formulated in the language of perfectly natural* or natural** 
properties determines the laws that physicists aim to find. Dasgupta puts this by saying that 
value is missing from Lewis’ perfectly natural properties.47  
     Notice that if we had a solution to the mismatch problem and could show that discovering or 
attempting to discover a TOE is objectively valuable we would also have a solution to the 
problem of missing value.48  Dasgupta argues that accounting for the value possessed by  our 
division  of the world into scientifically fundamental properties is to understand them as 
relative to us and our values and worries that this leads to the kind of anti-realism and 
relativism associated with Nelson Goodman. I will later argue that the PDA provides an account 
of the  source of the value of the properties that physics counts as fundamental that is objective 
and  realist without sliding into pernicious relativism.  
 
47 Dasgupta observes that it is ironic that Lewis raises exactly the missing value problem to accounts of objective 
probabilities which take them to be metaphysically fundamental propensities. He writes “Objective probabilities are 
supposed to be credence guiding via Lewis’ Principal Principle and its ilk but Lewis thinks that there is no 
explanation of why a metaphysically primitive propensity should guide credence. P.5  I just paraphrased Lewis’ 
famous objection to anti-Humean conceptions of objective chance, because my objection to realism is exactly 
analogous. Ironic, then, that the problem with realism can be found in the writings of someone I take to be an arch 
realist! But ironies aside, let us review Lewis’ argument so as to use it as a guide.” 
48 I owe this observation to David Albert in conversation.   
 To recap the problems with tying the best systematization account of laws to perfectly 
natural properties in the way the BSA does are a) there may be fundamental laws which do not 
connect perfectly natural properties, b) there are fundamental properties in physical theories 
seem to have at least some of their nomological roles necessarily and c) it leads to the 
mismatch and missing value problems.  Even if one is not convinced that the philosophical 
problems raised against building the BSA on the basis of perfectly natural properties are 
devastating one might find it attractive to see if it is possible to save the idea that propositions 
express lawful regularities in virtue of their role in systematizing without depending on this  
metaphysical assumption.  That is what the PDA attempts to do. 
 
                                                                     The PDA 
        The primary reason Lewis calls the BSA a “package deal” is that it  explains 
“why the scientific investigation of laws and of properties is a package deal; why physicists posit 
natural properties such as the quark colors in order to posit the laws in which those properties 
figure, so that laws and natural properties get discovered together. “ (Lewis 1983 p368) 
 But Lewis’ BSA is a methodological not a metaphysical package. Even though the BSA says that 
laws are posited together with instantiations of perfectly natural properties and the space-time 
in which they are instantiated the properties and space-time are metaphysically more 
fundamental.  In contrast, the PDA is a package on which fundamental properties, space-time, 
and an optimal systematization of the fundamental property instantiations are  metaphysically 
on a par. All are determined together. By making this alteration in the BSA I will argue that the 
PDA  avoids the problems encountered by the BSA. 
     The question that immediately arises is “if the PDA is a package in which includes both the 
fundamental properties and the laws earn  their places by their role in systematizing what is it 
that they systematize? Without an answer to this question what prevents the PDA from 
emptiness or succumbing  to the trivialization that befalls Lewis’ BSA sans a preferred 
language? The worry is that without Lewis’ requirement that the candidates for best system 
systematize the distribution of perfectly natural property instantiations there is nothing to 
prevent the PDA from selecting “gruesome” properties and ontology as fundamental or even 
Lewis’ Fx as a fundamental property and VxFx as the best theory? Answering this question 
involves a brief discussion of the nature and goals of physics.    
 
       The best way of understanding the enterprise of physics is that it begins, as Quine says,  “in 
the middle” with the investigation of the motions of macroscopic material objects e.g. planets, 
projectiles, pendula, pointers, and so on.49 Physics advances by proposing theories that include 
laws that explain the motions of macroscopic objects and their parts. These theories may (and 
often do) introduce  ontology, properties/relations, and laws beyond macroscopic ones with 
which it began and go onto to posit laws that explain their behaviors. For example,  in order to 
account for the melting  of  ice, the spreading of smoke, the growth of plants and so on it was 
proposed that these and other macroscopic objects are composed of tiny particles in motion. 
 
49 David Albert suggested the aptness of Quine’s way of putting characterizing physics. 
To explain the behavior of these particles  it was posited that these particles are 
electromagnetically charged, that they produce electromagnetic fields and satisfy Maxwell’s 
laws. Often, as in the case of classical mechanics and Maxwellian electromagnetics, conflicts 
arise between theories whose resolutions lead to the introduction of further theories with  
additional ontology, laws and space-time structures.50 The ultimate goal of this process is the 
discovery of  a theory of everything (TOE) that specifies  a fundamental ontology and 
fundamental laws that that cover not only the motions of macroscopic objects with which 
physics began but also whatever additional ontology and  quantities that have been introduced 
along the way. A true TOE systematizes its fundamental ontology and satisfies, to the greatest 
extent possible, the criteria that physicists have developed for evaluating fundamental theories 
i.e. truth, simplicity, informativeness, fit and so on. In other words, a true TOE is very much like 
a Lewisian best system.  Most important among these criteria is that the fundamental ontology 
and properties of a candidate TOE provides an explanatory supervenience basis for whatever 
non-fundamental that has been introduced to account for macroscopic physical phenomena. By 
this I mean that it is possible to  see or make plausible that macroscopic and special science 
facts and laws are grounded in fundamental facts and laws.51 
     Like the BSA the PDA is based on the idea that there exists an optimal systematization of the 
distribution of fundamental ontology and properties and that this systematization determines 
the  fundamental laws. But unlike the BSA the PDA does not assume the existence of Lewis’ 
 
50 Examples of this are the development of special relativity to resolve conflicts between classical mechanics and 
electromagnetic theory and the development of quantum mechanics to account for the stability of atoms. 
51 For this to be the case David Albert and I have argued that the TOE needs to include a probability distribution 
over physically possible histories of the universe. We call the package of fundamental dynamical laws and the 
probability distribution “the Mentaculus” and argue that specialscience laws, counterfactuals,  and probabilities are 
all  derivable from it. See Albert (2000,2015) and Loewer (2021) 
perfectly natural properties at the outset but rather posits a system of fundamental properties 
and laws together as described by the world’s optimal TOE. The PDA does this by explicitly 
building into the criteria for a candidate TOE that it provides the basis for explanation and 
prediction of the motions of macroscopic objects. These objects and their motions are initially 
described in terms of  the languages with which physical investigation begins.  This requirement 
replaces the role that the language of perfectly natural properties plays in the BSA. Instead of 
requiring that candidates for optimal systematization are all formulated in the language of 
perfectly natural properties it allows proposals for the fundamental language that specifies 
fundamental ontology and properties to vary along with systematizations. Candidates for the 
package consisting of a fundamental language  and systematization of the instantiations of its 
fundamental predicates are evaluated by how well they account for macroscopic phenomena 
and how well they systematize it and the further ontology it introduces. Fundamental laws of 
the world are the axioms of its TOE. 
Because the fundamental ontology and properties of the world’s TOE need not be 
metaphysically fundamental in the way Lewis’ perfectly natural properties supposed to be  I will 
call them “scientifically fundamental.”  Because the distribution of the scientifically 
fundamental ontology and properties plays the same role that the Humean mosaic plays in 
Lewis’ BSA I call it “the scientific mosaic” (SM). So, the answer to the question of  what a TOE 
systematizes according to the PDA is that it is it systematizes the distribution of the TOE’s 
fundamental properties and ontology; i.e. its SM.   The condition that a TOEs fundamental 
ontology provides the basis for explaining the motions of macroscopic  objects immediately 
excludes  VxFx from being a TOE. While VxF is maximally informative in the sense that it 
excludes all possibilities except the actual one it doesn’t  provide information expressed in the 
language scientists use to describe the motions of macroscopic objects and so doesn’t explain 
any macroscopic phenomena. The fact that a TOE provides accounts of the motions of 
macroscopic phenomena as described in ordinary languages and that  grueifying language 
results in unneeded complexity penalizes gruesome predicates keeps the TOE’s language from 
being gruesome.  
The scientifically fundamental  properties are the scientific joints of the world but they 
need not play all the roles that perfectly natural properties are supposed to play in Lewis’ 
metaphysics. Specifically, they need not be intrinsic and categorical and need not  satisfy the 
recombination principle in an account of possible worlds or be reference magnets in an account 
of meaning. This isn’t to deny that there may be Lewis’ perfectly natural properties that do all 
these and that their distribution is in some sense metaphysically fundamental but it is to claim 
that the scientifically fundamental properties may not be identical to them and  it is the  
scientifically fundamental properties that figure in the laws. The SM is the supervenience base 
for all contingent truths just as the HM is claimed to be on Lewis account. For Lewis contingent 
reality consists of and is exhausted by the HM. Talk of laws, probabilities, counterfactuals, 
causes,  cats, circuses and everything else contingent are ways of talking ultimately about the 
HM.  Similarly, talk of laws, probabilities,  counterfactuals, and so on are ways of talking about 
the SM. So far as I can see Lewis’ accounts of these, or improved versions, can provide accounts 
of their reductions  to the SM if they provide reductions to the HM.  
We might worry  that it is risky to build an account of laws that depends on the 
existence of a TOE since our world may not have one. Physicists have not  yet found a TOE since 
there is, as of now, no theory that  satisfactorily combines  general relativity with quantum 
mechanics that applies at very high energy scales and covers the very early universe, black 
holes and dark matter. What the ontology and laws of such a theory turn out to be and even if 
there is such a TOE is not known. But there is reason to hold that the standard model of 
effective quantum field theory together with GR- what Frank Wilczek calls “Core Theory implies  
all the lawful macroscopic regularities that hold in everyday life. Sean Carroll writes 
. I will argue that we have good reason to believe that this model is both accurate and 
complete within the everyday-life regime; in other words, that the laws of physics 
underlying everyday life are, at one level of description, completely known. This is not to 
claim that physics is nearly finished and that we are close to obtaining a Theory of 
Everything, but just that one particular level in one limited regime is now understood”.52 
By “everyday life” Wilczek and Carroll  mean not just everyday macroscopic phenomena but 
also phenomena of special sciences. Their reason for believing this is that the core theory 
explicitly limits the physical situations in which it holds, so far the evidence supports it, and the 
special sciences apply within these limits., This gives support to the belief that there  is a TOE of 
our world or a theory close enough  to play the role of a TOE determining the fundamental 
laws. The PDA proposes that the  world’s fundamental laws are axioms of a true TOE for the 
world and so entails that there are laws only if the world has a true TOE. We don’t want to say 
that  if it  turns  out that our world fails to have a TOE but it does have a theory that is 
 
52 Carroll (2021).  In addition to the quantum field theory of the standard  model and GR a theory capable of 
accounting for special science laws and macroscopic phenomena needs to include laws that underlie statistical 
mechanics. One way of doing this has been developed by David Albert and myself that consists of adding a 
probability distribution over the dynamically possible histories of the universe. We call this package “The 
Mentaculus” (Albert 2000, Loewer 2021) It is likely that any adequate TOE will include the Mentaculus.  
sufficiently close that there are no laws. So I suggest that the PDA is modified to say that even if 
the world doesn’t have a theory that covers all physical phenomena the laws are determined by 
a theory that comes closest to being  a TOE as long as it is sufficiently close. So according to the 
PDA there are laws only if the world is sufficiently orderly for there  to be a system that covers 
the majority of physical phenomena. While this is at odds with intuitions that are based on the 
governing conception of laws as mentioned earlier these intuitions derive from the theological 
origin of the concept of law of nature and the Humean PDA is proposed as a replacement  for 
that conception that better fits the practice of physics and Humean philosophical  views. 
      A different worry is that it may turn out that there are multiple formulations of TOEs for our 
world that differ in their fundamental properties and even in their laws. In fact, this seems 
inevitable since it is plausible that what is basic for one language will be defined in another and 
there may be more than one language in which a TOE can be formulated. If this is the case, 
then the basic predicates and fundamental properties of a world won’t be unique but relative 
to a language theory triple. So the PDA is not committed to  Hicks and Schaffer’s principle Link. 
This is a major departure from Lewis’ account which claims that there is a unique set of 
perfectly natural fundamental properties for each world. It also may turn out that given a  
fundamental language there is not a unique best systematization and so the set of laws is not 
unique and this may seem more problematic.  There is not much worry if the alternative 
systematizations agree on the nomological necessities although they disagree on which are 
axioms).  But it seems possible that for the actual world there may be systems that are 
scientifically optimal but differ on which propositions they count as lawful.53 We may hope that 
this won’t be the case, but should it turn out to be it is plausible that all TOEs will agree on the 
core theory. If there is disagreement it will only in the highly theoretical parts of a theory.54 
Lewis envisioned this possibility for his version of the BSA and suggested that the laws are 
propositions that are those that   are entailed by all optimal systems.  Another response, also 
suggested by Lewis, is that there are further criteria on candidate systems whose satisfaction 
results in selecting systems that agree on laws. Failing that a better proposal is to accept that 
both being a law and being  a scientifically fundamental property is system relative.55  
    
    Virtues of the PDA 
       The PDA is a major improvement over Lewis’ BSA. It earns its Humean credentials by 
rejecting the non-Humean view that laws “govern” or are the product of fundamental 
necessary connections in favor of the view that laws systematize. It preserves the Humean 
feature that being a law supervenes on the distribution of instantiations of scientifically  
fundamental properties. But unlike Lewis’ BSA it doesn’t rely on the world being, as Putnam 
says “ready-made” with a unique division into metaphysically fundamental properties that 
physics has the job of revealing.  Instead,  it allows that there may be multiple  ways of dividing 
 
53 Although two systems may disagree on which generalizations are laws since laws  must be true the 
generalizations must be mutually consistent. 
54 Recall that one of the requirements on a law determining TOE is that it is true. Alternative TOEs may differ on 
what propositions they count as laws but they must be consistent with one another. 
55 On a governing account of laws there must be a unique set of laws that govern. But on Lewis’ BSA and the PDA 
laws don’t govern but what makes a sentence express a law is its role in systematizing. I see no problem in there 
being more than one best systematization of the truths expressible in a language. 
up deserving the title “scientifically fundamental” in virtue of being parts packages that 
optimally satisfies criteria developed within physics.  
      I discussed five problems that result from basing the BSA on perfectly natural properties. 
The four are 1) The BSA endorses Link but Link seems at odds with how physicists treat 
fundamental properties and laws, 2) Quantum mechanics and the QFT of the standard model  
posit fundamental properties and relations that violate HS or are not intrinsic to the regions in 
which they are instantiated and  are not categorical and whose ontologies don’t fit easily into 
the framework of individuals and properties. 3) we know fundamental properties by the laws 
they are involved in suggesting that they are not categorical, 4) the mismatch problem, 5) the 
problem of missing value.  The PDA handles all five.  
          According to the PDA there need not be a unique collection of fundamental properties. 
Different TOEs that differ in their basic predicates and functions and so differ in what properties 
they count as fundamental may still entail the same nomological necessities. This is illustrated 
by Newtonian and Hamiltonian formulations of classical mechanical laws. The BSA is committed 
to saying that the properties of at most one of these theories are perfectly natural. 
       Unlike the BSA the PDA has no difficulty accommodating quantum mechanics, string theory 
or the QFT representation of quantities (e.g. quark  color) as fiber bundles since it makes no 
commitment to the structure of the fundamental space-time or to whether the quantities 
referred to by predicates and function symbols in a TOE are intrinsic or categorical.   
      One of the most interesting features of the PDA is that it is non-committal about whether 
fundamental properties are categorical or dispositional. This is due to the fact that theoretical 
terms are uninterpreted except  in so far as their meanings are given by their roles in the TOE. 
These meanings are constrained by the TOEs accounting for the motions of macroscopic objects 
but this allows for the predicates in the theory to be interpreted as referring either to 
categorical or dispositional properties.   Consider, for example, in  Newtonian mechanics the 
predicate “mass” can be interpreted as referring  to either a categorical or to a dispositional 
quantity. If the latter, then mass necessarily satisfies the Newtonian laws. But these necessary 
connections should not offend Humean sensibilities. Such necessities are in a sense ”verbal.” 
They are artefacts of the best systematization imposed by it rather than determining its laws. In 
general, the PDA allow the predicates and function terms that occur in a TOE to be interpreted 
either as referring to either to categorical properties or to properties that necessarily satisfy 
some or all of the laws in which they occur. This doesn’t solve the problem of whether 
scientifically  fundamental properties are categorical or dispositional but it does suggest that 
this is not a problem that needs to be solved by an account of scientifically fundamental 
properties and laws.  
     The PDA doesn’t  say anything  about what properties are metaphysically fundamental or 
even if there are metaphysically fundamental properties. At its most metaphysically 
fundamental level reality might be a whole that possesses many different structures. But it is 
compatible with the PDA that there is a unique fundamental structure consisting of space times 
filled with  Lewis’ perfectly natural properties. The PDA just claims  that these properties need 
not be scientifically fundamental and it is not the  systematization of their distribution of  that 
determines the  laws.56   
 
      As mentioned above, if a predicate is interpreted as referring to a property that is 
individuated by some of the laws in which it occurs and so satisfies the laws necessarily this 
should not disturb a Humean since the necessity is imposed from above by the law in contrast 
to the powers view the  law is a consequence of the power. Humeanism is not committed to 
their being no necessary connections between properties but only to laws not being 
determined by necessary connections between properties and to there not being necessary 
connections between metaphysically fundamental properties. The PDA says nothing about 
metaphysically fundamental properties- even that there are any- and according to the laws are 
determined by the best systematization. 57 
     Heather Demarest has proposed a different way of combing a best systems account of laws 
with necessary connections.58 According to Demarest fundamental properties are powers or 
potencies that necessarily connect objects that instantiate them.  Laws are axioms of the 
system that best systematizes the distribution of the properties in all worlds in which they are 
 
56 A similar idea is developed in Bhogal and Perry (forthcoming) 
57 A third way of understanding the properties in the PDA is along the lines of Michael Esfeld’s SuperHumeanism. 
On this account the only fundamental  ontology consists of point particles and the only fundamental relations are 
distances between particles. Predicates that seem to refer to properties are interpreted in a manner similar to Humean 
accounts of laws and probabilities as devices for summarizing the totality particle distance relations. On this account 
the property referred by e.g. “mass” is not intrinsic to a particle that instantiates it but its value supervenes on the 
totality of interparticle distances. This account fits the general approach of the PDA in that macroscopic physical 
properties supervene on particle positions. But by obliterating the role of laws and probabilities on the  one hand and 
fundamental physical magnitudes on the other it is at odds with the criteria physics employs for evaluating candidate 
fundamental theories. Callender points out that it is often  incompatible with formulating initial value problems. See 
Callender (2020 and  Loewer (forhthcoming) 
58 See Demarest (2017) 
the fundamental  properties. This is an ingenious idea that enables  powers accounts to avoid 
the mismatch problem and also solve the problem of  combining multiple powers.59 Unlike the 
PDA it is genuinely anti-Humean since what makes a generalization a law is that its predicates 
refer to properties that are necessarily connected. In contrast, the PDA counts as Humean since 
what makes a generalization lawful  is its being entailed by a TOE.  If the properties referred to 
in a generalization are dispositional it is because they  appear in the law.  
     The mismatch problem cannot arise on the PDA since the scientifically fundamental 
predicates and the fundamental theory are determined together with each other as a package. 
While there is no  guarantee  that science will  ever discover a TOE for the world the PDA does 
guarantee that if one is discovered its axioms will be fundamental laws and the generalizations 
it entails will be nomologically necessary. The PDA also points towards a solution to Dasgupta’s 
missing value problem without sliding into relativism. .  Dasgupta’s asked why systematizing the 
distribution of  instantiations of Lewis’ perfectly natural properties is more valuable than 
systematizing the distribution of natural* or natural ** or…..  properties. This is a way of 
challenging to explain why systematizing  perfectly natural properties are of value to physics at 
all. The PDA answers to challenge by providing an account of why it is valuable to systematize 
the instantiations  not of perfectly natural properties but of scientifically fundamental 
properties. The reason it is of value to discover scientifically fundamental properties is that they 
are components of a TOE that optimally satisfies criteria that  have been developed and shaped 
by science. These criteria are designed to achieve the aim of organizing, predicting,  and 
 
59 Since an object may be subject to multiple powers the powers account needs to be supplemented with a principle 
or law about how they combine. Demarest’s account does this. 
explaining truths, initially about macroscopic phenomena and then about all  phenomena in its 
domain. It is evident that  discovery  of a TOE and its lawful regularities is epistemically valuable 
for the community of scientists and that it has consequences that are valuable more generally. 
There some relativism remaining in this account since a true TOE is responsible for accounting 
for the behaviors of macroscopic  objects as characterized in the human languages with which 
physics begins and it is required to satisfy criteria that have been developed within the 
community of science. To this degree being a TOE is relative to human scientists. But this 
doesn’t take away from the fact that it is an objective matter that a whether or not a theory is a 
TOE or that if it is that is objectively valuable.  
         Lewis’ metaphysical viewpoint is that of a God surveying all of reality to find its best 
systematization. God knows which properties are perfectly natural and knows their distribution 
in space-time. It is the job of physics to find the laws by finding its best systematization. But as 
Quine says that  while 
It is understandable […] that the philosopher should seek a transcendental vantage point, 
outside the world that imprisons [the] natural scientist and mathematician. He would make 
himself independent of the conceptual scheme which it is his task to study and revise. “Give me 
πoυ στω [a place to stand]”, Archimedes said, “and I will move the world.” However, there is no 
such cosmic exile. […] The philosopher is in the position rather, as Neurath says, “of a mariner 
who must rebuild his ship on the open sea”.60 
 
60W. V. Quine in  (notes for Sign and Object, November 5, 1944) as quoted by Verhaegh (2018) 
The PDA  takes Quine’s view seriously. It replaces the view that reality is composed of 
metaphysically given perfectly natural properties and replaces it with the view that scientifically 
fundamental properties and laws are the product of science working from within the world. It 
thus results in an account of laws and fundamental properties that is more friendly to 
contemporary physics and an account that to a certain extent transcends the debate between 
Humeans and certain non-Humeans. Because it provides an account of the scientific joints of 
the world that doesn’t rely on metaphysics alone but on the aims of science it rejects the ultra-
realists view that, in Putnam’s words, there is a “ready-made world” and endorses a more 
modest realism, also in Putnam’s words, that “the mind and the world make up the mind and 
the world.”* 
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